One of the main events at the end of the era of bipolar relations and Washington’s attempt to move to a unipolar world was the war in the Persian Gulf (1990—1991). In its course, the United States managed to defeat the Iraqi army and liberate Kuwait, previously captured by the regime of S. Hussein. However, despite the defeat, the charismatic Iraqi leader managed to stay in power. The article analyzes the reasons why Washington decided not to wage war until complete victory and not to send its troops to Iraq, despite the feeling of “incomplete victory” that arose as a result of this in American society. The author singles out two main groups of political reasons: domestic and foreign, which, in turn, are considered through the factors of the difficult socio-economic situation in the United States, the acute interdepartmental struggle in the administration of George W. Bush Sr., and the White House’s desire to avoid disagreements with the Arab world and Soviet rapprochement. In conclusion, it is believed that Washington had no real interest in the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The war in the Persian Gulf was only part of the global transformation of the bipolar system of international relations and the reformatting of the situation in the Middle East, which led to the fact that the United States, despite public rhetoric, was actually interested in keeping Saddam Hussein’s regime in power.
For citations:
Khristenko D.N. The US factor in preserving S. Hussein’s regime stability’s after the Gulf War (1990—1991), Ivanovo State University Bulletin, Series: Humanities, 2023, iss. 2, pp. 122—131.