DOI: 10.46726/H.2026.1.13
The article is devoted to the study of the views of the Red Army command on ensuring anti-tank defense of the French and Polish armies and their confrontation with German mechanized units in 1939—1940. The work examines the assessments of the reasons for the defeat of the anti-tank defense of Poland and France by the Soviet command. The reports of Soviet generals at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army, articles in military magazines and newspapers, including foreign ones, are provided. As a result of the research work, a conclusion was made that anti-tank defense is capable of repelling a massive offensive of mechanized units only under the condition of preparing positions to an operational depth of more than 25 kilometers and the availability of large mobile reserves. The decisive role in repelling the tank offensive was assigned to the anti-tank units of the Reserve of the General Command, which were to defeat the advancing mechanized units on the basis of pre-prepared anti-tank defensive areas and natural and artificial obstacles. An additional factor in the defeat of France and Poland, according to the Soviet command, was the qualitative lag in the development of anti-tank defense systems and their low availability in the troops.
For citation: Vetoshkin N.A. Anti-tank defense in the Polish and French campaigns of 1939—1940. Assessments of the Red Army command, Ivanovo State University Bulletin, Series: Humanities, 2026, iss. 1, pp. 98—104.